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Should the ALI Take a Position on Capital Punishment?

Several years ago, the American Law Institute started the
process of revising the sentencing provisions of the MPC.
One of the early questions that project participants struggled with was whether to take a stand on the legitimacy of
the death penalty as a sentencing option. In their preliminary draft, the reporter and advisers decided against
addressing that highly charged issue.
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Blakely and its progeny temporarily halted the ALI’s sentencing project. Only
recently have the reporter and advisers regained their
bearings and developed at least a preliminary plan to
accommodate the requirements of that decision. With the
ALI’s sentencing project restarting its engines, this may
be the last opportunity to reconsider whether the ALI
should take a stand on the death penalty. This essay
argues that it should.
The argument in favor of taking a position on capital
punishment is straightforward. The Model Penal Code
analyzes and makes recommendations on all aspects of
state-sanctioned punishment, and no one would deny that
the death penalty falls in that category. The refusal to take
a position on the death penalty thus represents an ad hoc
exception to the general approach of the Model Penal
Code, and the burden of proof always lies with those who
favor ad hoc exceptions.
There are four main arguments in opposition. The
first is based on principle—that the matter whether to
execute murderers is at bottom a moral or political question and not a legal one, which makes it an inappropriate
subject for the ALI. The second argument is based on
precedent. The original MPC carefully avoided taking
any position on capital punishment, and (according to
this argument) the burden of persuasion therefore rests
upon those who would part from that well-considered
decision. The third argument is that the ALI should not
come out against the death penalty because it will have
effectively excluded itself from any future debates about
capital sentencing procedures. The final argument bows
in the direction of political reality. According to this
argument, whatever valuable suggestions the Sentencing
Project might contain will be trampled in the stampede
to praise or condemn the Project’s position on the death
penalty.

Let us first consider the question of whether the moral
issues raised by the capital punishment debate make it an
inappropriate topic for the ALI. To be sure, the MPC is
heavy with technical propositions, such as what physical
conduct suffices as a “substantial step” for attempt liability, or whether a purpose to aid is required for accomplice
liability, to take just two examples. But the Code also takes
plenty of positions on questions that obviously rest on
moral assumptions. The Code took the position that an
insanity defense should be available based not only on
impairment of cognitive ability but also on impairment of
volitional capacity. To be sure, the scientists of the time
were optimistic (falsely so, it turns out) that the legal system would be able to measure volitional impairment with
some precision, and to that degree the inclusion of volitional impairment as a basis for the defense was premised
on empirical assumptions. That view, however, ignored
the fact that empirical assumptions alone were never
enough to support the Institute’s decision to make volitional impairment a basis for the insanity defense. That
decision required another premise, namely, that those
who truly cannot control their physical actions are not
morally culpable.
Another prominent example of an MPC proposition
based on moral considerations is the Institute’s decision
to make what is now known as “acquaintance rape” a generally less serious offense than “stranger rape.” Professor
Louis B. Schwartz, who was responsible for the drafting of
this provision, stated in the comment that this differential
treatment was justified by the lower level of social outrage
and apprehension occasioned by forcible sex between former sexual partners or voluntary social companions. This
is nominally an empirical question—how do most people
feel about stranger rape versus acquaintance rape?—but
thinly veils a moral one: Is stranger rape really “worse”
than acquaintance rape? My many conversations with Professor Schwartz, who was my colleague and criminal law
mentor in his last decade of academic service, made it
obvious to me that he truly believed stranger rape was a
greater moral transgression. Surely the drafters of the
MPC would not have moved forward with this provision if
they had only their individual moral views to go on, but
neither would they have moved forward relying entirely
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upon their empirical assumptions about levels of social
outrage.
Capital punishment does not differ in kind from these
examples. The debate over the death penalty involves
empirical disagreements—over deterrence, over recidivism rates for prisoners serving life without possibility of
parole, over the degree of racial discrimination involved in
capital sentencing, and, most recently, over error rates. It
would be disingenuous to deny that the debate over the
death penalty does not also include a debate over the
morality of state-sanctioned killing in the absence of exigent circumstances. Indeed, it is my intuition that this
moral question is the single most important factor in the
capital punishment equation. This does not, however,
make the issue of capital punishment different in kind
from insanity or the grading of rape. Nor does it differentiate the issue of capital punishment from the issue of
whether to permit strict liability for killings during crime
(aka “the felony-murder” rule), which the MPC rejects.
The argument from precedent cannot be taken too seriously. The ALI is, after all, not a court. It is a
policy-recommending body, something between a legislature and a think tank. Neither legislatures nor think tanks
ordinarily consider themselves “bound” by their past substantive decisions. (Legislators sometimes cite past
practice with respect to legislative procedures, but that is a
different matter.) It is generally thought that the doctrine
of stare decisis serves two important functions—first, to
ensure equal treatment of litigants across time; and second, to protect justifiable reliance interests. Obviously
neither of these interests is implicated here. The ALI has
not “treated” anyone in any manner, and no one has relied
on the ALI’s refusal to take a position on the death
penalty. It might be argued that the ALI’s neutrality on the
death penalty has served the Institute well, helping it steer
clear of political entanglements that would bog the Institute down in the pursuit of its greater mission. But that is
not a stare decisis argument so much as an argument about
consequences.
The third argument against taking a position on capital
punishment is that, if the Institute condemns it, the Institute will be prevented from having any future input on
capital sentencing procedures. The premise is that, once
the Institute has called for the abolition of capital punishment, it cannot then insist upon having a say in how
capital sentencing procedures are structured. This would
be a particular shame, considering that the Institute’s historic neutrality on the death penalty allowed it to have so
much influence on the fashioning of post–Furman v.
Georgia capital sentencing procedures around the nation.
But the premise is mistaken. There is no logical reason
why the Institute cannot condemn the death penalty and
still offer suggestions as to what capital sentencing ought
to look like. Lawyers and courts often make arguments in
the alternative; nothing prevents the ALI from doing the
same. For the Institute to offer a model capital sentencing
procedure at the same time it condemns the death penalty
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may undermine the seriousness of the condemnation, but
the Institute is always free to offer such suggestions later,
after acknowledging that the prospects of abolition have
become remote.
The only argument against taking a position on the death
penalty that survives serious scrutiny is the last one: There is
a very real danger that whatever position the ALI takes on
capital punishment will largely overshadow any other
insights the Sentencing Project might contain. Certainly a
position on the death penalty would be the only “newsworthy” story in the Project. Endorsing the death penalty would
make it considerably harder for the Institute to persuade liberals and academics that the rest of the Project was worth
considering, just as rejecting the death penalty would make it
difficult to get conservatives and law enforcement organizations to approach the balance of the Project with an open
mind. It is not just that the death penalty polarizes like no
other subject in the criminal law, but that it has a tendency to
stop rational discourse in its tracks.
Could anything be done to ameliorate the practical
effects of taking a position on the death penalty? The Institute might include a severability clause stating that, even if
a state legislature disagrees with the Institute’s position on
the death penalty, the rest of the Project should nonetheless be adopted. This idea has promise. It would permit
the Institute to take the principled course—making recommendations on every matter central to criminal
sentencing—without seeming to put state legislatures in
the position of adopting all or nothing. Admittedly, there
would be some complications. Suppose the Institute
rejected the death penalty and adopted a severability
clause of the sort I have suggested. Presumably some
changes to the Project’s recommendations would have to
be made in a state that wishes to retain the death penalty.
Should the Institute go on to make an alternative set of
recommendations for such states? This would make for
some extra work on the part of the Institute, but the added
burden would hardly be crushing.
The more pointed question is whether a severability
clause would really be effective. It is one thing for a court
to enforce the valid portions of a statute or contract
because of the presence of a severability clause; it is quite
another to expect politicians and the public to respect such
a clause in a legislative recommendation. Those who wish
to engage in demagoguery will surely convict the remainder of the Project on a guilt-by-association theory. Despite
these doubts, I believe a severability clause could work.
Proponents of adopting the Project would be able to point
to the clause and say that the drafters foresaw this precise
situation. And, if the Institute were to adopt an alternative
set of recommendations, those same proponents could
trumpet the alternative recommendations as a custom fit.
In this way, even if the ALI taking a position on the death
penalty were to make a big immediate splash, the unintended ripple effects could be minimized.
There is one other alternative. The Institute could defer
taking a position on the death penalty until such time as it
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is able to undertake a project on “Principles Governing the
Use of State-Sponsored Lethal Force,” or the like. This
would purport to cover lethal force on the battlefield, preventative killings by domestic police, assassinations of
terrorist leaders, and the death penalty at home. The death
penalty is a form of punishment and is therefore appropriately covered in a document purporting to cover all aspects
of punishment, such as the MPC. But the death penalty is
also an application of state-sponsored lethal force, and it
would hardly be a stretch to say that the death penalty
should, at a minimum, hew to a few general principles
that govern all uses of such force. So taking a position on
the death penalty in the MPC Sentencing Project or in
some future “lethal force” project would be equally princi-

pled. This is not the place to make a full-fledged project
proposal; suffice it to say that the Institute should not
defer taking a position on the death penalty if its leadership does not sincerely intend to pursue something like a
“lethal force” project.
I have come down on the side of upholding principle
and against political expediency. This is not because expedience never trumps principle but rather because I
believe there are at least two acceptable measures the
Institute can take to render the principled course less
costly. The line between bravery and foolishness may be
fine, but the line between prudence and cowardice can be
equally so. The ALI should say what it thinks about the
death penalty.
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